Alexander Huber
Vienna University of Economics and Business
Daniel Schäfer
Johannes Kepler University Linz
Sofie R. Waltl
University of Cambridge
Abstract
On July 1, 2023, Austria implemented the Bestellerprinzip, mandating that the party hiring a real estate agent bears the brokerage fee. Using comprehensive rental listing and administrative data from Vienna, we estimate the reform’s effects on market outcomes. The policy led to a sharp decline in the number of listings, driven by reduced agent usage, and to significant rent increases across all segments. Rent increases exceeded simple cost pass-through, implying losses for new tenants. Real estate agents were less often employed than before yet, if involved, costs were fully shifted over to tenants contradicting the policy goal. The reform thus failed to achieve its short-run objectives, though it may increase residential mobility over time by narrowing cost differences across contract types. In the long-term, older tenants, natives and first-generations immigrants will likely bear the cost of this policy reform due to their low residential mobility. We further show that first-generation rent controls are widely disregarded at the advertising stage, as these units experienced disproportionately large increases in asking rents upon enactment of this policy, consistent with the weak enforcement incentives in Austria
Keywords: Rental Market; Ordering Principle; Statutory Incidence; Agents; Volume Effects; Price Effects, Free Riders; Rent Control; Austria
JEL codes: D04, H22, R31, R38
Presentations (incl. scheduled):
[1st Housing Policy Symposium, WU Vienna][4th Workshop on Residential Housing: Balancing Sustainability and Affordability in the Building Sector, University of Zurich][Center for Excellence in Finance and Economic Research (CEFER), Bank of Lithuania][Housing Studies Association Annual Conference 2026, Sheffield]
Sofie R Waltl 