Alexander Huber
Vienna University of Economics and Business
Daniel Schäfer
Johannes Kepler University Linz
Sofie R. Waltl
University of Cambridge
Abstract
On July 1, 2023, Austria introduced the “Bestellerprinzip,” requiring the party hiring a real estate agent to pay the fee. Using comprehensive rental advertisement and administrative data for Vienna, we study the reform’s effects. We find a sharp decline in listings due to reduced agent use, alongside significant rent increases across all market segments. Rents rose beyond simple cost pass-through, implying losses for tenants entering new long-term contracts and for agents. While the reform did not achieve its short-run policy goals, it may increase residential mobility over time as cost differences between contract types narrow. We also show that Vienna’s first-generation rent controls are widely ignored at the advertising stage, as these units saw even larger increases in advertised rents, consistent with Austria’s weak and retrospektive enforcement incentives.
Keywords: Rental Market; Ordering Principle; Statutory Incidence; Agents; Volume Effects; Price Effects, Free Riders; Rent Control; Austria
JEL codes: D04, H22, R31, R38
Presentations (incl. scheduled):
[1st Housing Policy Symposium, WU Vienna][4th Workshop on Residential Housing: Balancing Sustainability and Affordability in the Building Sector, University of Zurich]
Sofie R Waltl 